文章：Berrone, Pascual Gomez-Mejia, R.Luis: EnvironmentalPerformanceAnd Executive Compensation: An Integrated Agency-InstitutionalPerspective.Academy of ManagementJournal.2009. Vol.52. No.1 pp.103-126.

摘要：Relying oninstitutional theory, agency rationale,and environmental management research,we hypothesize that, in pollutingindustries, good environmental performanceincreases CEO pay; thatenvironmental governance mechanisms strengthen thislinkage; that pollutionprevention strategies affect executive compensation morethan end-of-pipepollution control; and that long-term pay increases pollutionprevention success.Using longitudinal data on 469 U.S. firms, we found supportfor threehypotheses. Contrary to our expectations, firms with an explicitenvironmentalpay policy and an environmental committee do not rewardenvironmentalstrategies more than those without such structures, suggestingthat thesemechanisms play a merely symbolic role.